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KUm V oroshilov and the Red Cavalry: Reassessing 
the Most Incompetent Man in the ~ed Army 
Stephen Brown (University of Wollongong) 
Cavalrymen have not had a good press in the twentieth century, 
especially when their responsibilities have extended outside their 
specialist field. In his memoirs, former Prime Minister Lloyd George 
blamed the 'ridiculous cavalry obsession' of his generals for the 
needless deaths of British soldiers in World War One. I A variation on 
this theme is to be found in the literature concerning the Red Army in 
the lead-up to the Second World War. Here the alleged culprit was 
KErn Voroshilov (1881-1969), the man chosen by Joseph Stalin to 
serve as Peoples Commissar for Military and Naval Affairs from 1925 
to 1934 and Commissar for Defence from 1934 to 1940. Voroshilov 
gained his battlefield experience in the Russian Civil War of 1918-20 
when he was a commander of the First Cavalry Army, the largest and 
most successful of tpe Red Army's cavalry units. For most 
commentators, V oroshilov remained throughout his life a cavalry 
enthusiast who 'insisted on a larger role in maneuver warfare being 
played by horse cavalry'2 long after it was obvious that the age of the 
mounted soldier had passed. Voroshilov has assumed the role of an 
archetypal military villain, a 'dim-witted political genera!' 3 and 'a 
talentless, unattractive mediocrity,4 whose passion for the cavalry and 
slavish devotion to Joseph Stalin helped to ensure that the Red Army 
was not ready to fight the early battles of World War Two. 5 
While it is not uncommon for soldiers to find that their careers 
are evaluated less positively after they have passed from the scene, 
Voroshilov's fall from grace was spectacular by any standards. A 
Bolshevik since 1903, Voroshilov found himself involved in the 
organisation of the Red Army at the outset of the Civil War in 1918. 
Despite the fact that he had no previous military experience, he rose to 
become an army and front commander. His alliance with Stalin began 
when the two men served as members of the revolutionary military 
councils that directed the Tenth Army and South Front in 1918. 
Voroshilov and Stalin teamed up again in 1919 to help organise the 
First Cavalry Army whose commander was the legendary cavalryman, 
'. 
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Semen Budennyi. Joining the revolutionary military council of the 
First Cavalry Army, Voroshilov acted as co-commander and political' 
organiser of what would prove to be the Red Army's most successful 
cavalry unit. After the Civil War, Stalin relied upon veterans of the 
First Cavalry Army to consolidate his hold over the Soviet military 
establishment. Having taken over leadership of the Red Army in 1925, 
V oroshilov initiated the Stalin cult by writing the hagiographic Stalin 
and the Civil War which first appeared in 1929. The favour was 
returned when Soviet literature of the 1930s exaggerated Voroshilov's 
achievements in the Civil War, passed over in silence his defeats and 
praised him as a military organiser of genius. 
After Stalin's death, Voroshilov fell from favour with 
Khrushchev and his involvement in the failed 'Anti-Party Plot' 
ensured that during the last eleven years of his life, he was subjected to 
increasing criticism. In particular, Voroshilov fared badly in 
comparisons with his great rival and deputy of the inter-war years, 
Mikhail Tukhachevskii.6 Tukhachevskii served as a tsarist officer in 
World War One, was the Red Army's most successful commander in 
the Civil War and in the 1920s earned a reputation as a military 
theorist of world standing. Soviet writers in the era of de-Stalinisation 
considered that Tukhachevskii was the real leader of the Red Army 
and its likely commander-in-chief were war to have broken out. 
Whether this would indeed have happened will never be known for 
Tukhachevskii was the most famous victim of the notorious military 
purge that struck the Red Army in the late 1930s. The arrest and 
execution of Tukhachevskii in June 1937 was the trigger for the 
removal of thousands of Red Army officers from their posts, 
effectively decapitating the Red Army on the eve of World War Two. 
Veterans of the First Cavalry Army were the only group to 
survive the purge of the high command more or less intact,1 John 
Erickson and Robert Conquest have argued that the impetus for the 
military purge came from Stalin and that the dictator's determination 
to rid civilian politics of all those who were not his creatures 
inevitably extended to the military command.s The leaders of the First 
Cavalry Army were spared because they represented the only group 
within the high command whose loyalty had never been in question. 
Other commentators have speculated that Voroshilov may not simply 
have presided over the purge on Stalin's orders but actively pursued 
the destruction of his fellow commanders. We now know that 
discussions were held in 1936 between Tukhachevskii and fellow 
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officers as to ways of bringing about the dismissal of Voroshilov.
9 
Attention has been called to Voroshilov's background in the Red 
cavalry and the siege mentality of the mounted arm in the face of what 
appeared to be inevitable redundancy once, sufficient tanks were 
available.lO On the surface, it seems plausible that the military purge 
was, at least in part, a cavalryman's coup by means of which 
Voroshilov aimed to preserve his leadership and safeguard the future 
of the Red cavalry. 
There is no space here to reassess every aspect of Voroshilov's 
fifteen-year reign over the Red Army. This paper is limited to 
reassessing a key charge against Voroshilov, his alleged obsession with 
the Red cavalry. It will be argued that Voroshilov's cavalry bias was a 
figment of the imagination of Soviet historians writing in the era of 
de-Stalinisation, an assessment that soon found an echo in accounts of 
the Red Army that would appear in the West. Evidence that 
Voroshilov acted as an advocate of the Red cavalry comes mainly 
from his public pronouncements. Thus, Voroshilov boasted to the 
Eighteenth Party Congress in 1939 that cavalry numbers had increased 
by 52% between 1935 and 1939.11 A year earlier he gave an 
assessment of the Red cavalry that claimed: 
Cavalry in every army of the world is undergoing or, more accurately, has 
undergone, a crisis and in many armies has completely died out. .. We take a 
different view ... The Red cavalry, as before, is a battle-winning and crushing 
military force that can and will decide military tasks on all fronts.
12 
Quotations' such as the one above are often cited to demonstrate 
Voroshilov's misplaced faith in mounted warfare but are misleading 
when viewed in isolation. It would be easy, on the basis of 
Voroshilov's speeches, to show that the Defence Commissar supported 
each and every part of the Red Army. Official Soviet discourse did not 
allow for public debate of sensitive issues. To establish Voroshilov's 
views, we need to examine not just his published writings and speeches 
but also the private comments he made in discussions with his fellow 
commanders of the Red Army. Among the documents made available 
from Soviet archives in recent years are the transcripts of the 
discussions heid .at the annual review and planning meetings of the Red 
Army. Until 1934, the most senior commanders of the Red Army met 
as members of the Revolutionary Military Council or Rewoensovet, 
and thereafter as members of an advisory Defence Council attached to 
_. ____ .. ,..,. .. ...,. .... "'~...,,'''r-'.-·...,..,...'·-'·'~'...,--~ .. " -" • ..,.,----.----.-_.- --
" 
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the Defence Commissariat. 13 Voroshilov's public support for the Red 
cavalry did not carry through into these private discussions involving 
his fellow Red Army commanders. Underlying his commentary on the 
Red cavalry is a consistent concern about the likely impotence of 
cavalry in a future war, a concern that places Voroshi10v squarely in 
the camp of the cavalry sceptics and not of the cavalry enthusiasts. 
Preparing the Red cavalry for modem warfare was one of the 
great challenges for the Soviet military establishment of the inter-war 
period. The Red cavalry of the I 920s was called upon· to learn to fight 
dismounted, to shoottnore accurately and to cooperate more 
effectively with infantry, machine guns and artillery. It was recognised 
that the cavalry would need aerial support, anti-aircraft guns and 
tactical refinements designed to offer protection from air attack. In 
addition, the cavalry was expected to know how to move at night, to 
find shelter in forests and to ford major rivers. The Red cavalry 
struggled to meet the objectives set for it. Veteran cavalrymen 
accepted the importance of firepower but insisted that proper training 
in the traditional cavalry skills was also necessary. Heading the Red 
cavalry for much of the inter-war period was one such veteran, Semen 
Budennyi, the founder of the First Cavalry Army 'and the Red Army's 
Inspector of Cavalry from 1924 to 1937. Budennyi and Voroshilov 
remained life-long friends but the same could not be said of 
Budennyi's relationship with Tukhachevskii or the other principal 
moderniser of the inter-war period, Vladimir Triandiffillov. In his The 
Nature of the Operations of Modern Armies published in 1929, 
Triandifillov wrote that cavalry could participate in modem war only 
by means of fire weapons and ruled out altogether the use of charges 
in formation or cold steel. I4 The ripostes from Budennyi were often 
vitriolic betraying the insecurity of many Red cavalrymen. 
Historians have tended to conflate the outlook of Voroshilov 
and Budennyi on the issue of the Red cavalry. Budennyi was a dyed-
in-the-wool cavalryman whose handlebar moustache and cavalry 
experience extended back to the Russo-Japanese War of 1904-05. 
Budennyi represented a xenophobic, anti-modem trend in the Red 
Army. He complained that the secret collaboration with the German 
Army in the 1920s was 'turning the heads of the Red Army's young 
commanders'.15 Voroshilov, by contrast, was one of the Red Army's 
staunchest supporters of the military collaboration between the Soviet 
Union and the Weimar RepUblic. Triandifillov noted in 1927 that 'we 
argue about cavalry every year... in the past year only V oroshilov has 
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supported me' .16 In 1928, Voroshilov asked Alexander Egorov, an 
ally from (he Civil War to tone down his criticisms of Tukhachevskii's 
leadership of the Red Army's failed attack on Warsaw in August 
1920.17 Voroshilov's displays of even handedness extended to the Red 
cavalry's supporters as well as to its critics, In 1928 when a draft 
containing the damning judgment that 'cavalry was not prepared or 
suited to modem war' was submitted to the Revvoensovet, Voroshilov 
argued that the offending passage be struck out of the final report. 18 
In part, Voroshilov strove to appear objective in disputes among 
his subordinates in order to establish his authority over a military 
establishment that retained a degree of independence until the 1937 
purge. On the other hand, V oroshilov could not help but make his 
reservations about the mounted arm known. Reviewing the Red 
Army's performance each year, Voroshilov was often critical of each 
arm of the Red Army, but he often reserved his most damning remarks 
for the cavalry. In 1929, Voroshilov summed up the Red cavalry's 
performance in bleak terms, noting that the Red cavalrymen were 
quite good with their horses and weapons but as units they were failing 
in their tasks. V oroshilov complained that the Red cavalry had gone 
backwards since the Civil War for it could no longer cooperate 
effectively with artillery and machine gunners. He was unhappy with 
the reconnaissance over both short and longer distances while the work 
of guarding the cavalry on the move and at rest was equally bad. 
V oroshilov virtually wrote off the previous seven years of training 
when he complained that 'at present the Red cavalry could do little 
more than shout hurrah and charge'. The vulnerability of cavalry to 
attack from the air especially troubled Voroshilov who reminded 
Budennyi that during the Civil War, the First Cavalry Army's worst 
defeat was brought about by Polish aircraft, who slaughtered fifteen 
hundred cavalrymen on a single day in August 1920.19 
The Red Army was to be transformed by the first Five-Year 
Plan that got under way in 1928. By the mid 1930s, the Red Army had 
an army of tanks and aircraft that for the most part lived up to Soviet 
boasts of having a modem fighting force the equal of any in the 
world.20 The enthusiasm underlying the development of new 
equipment for the Red Army had its counterpart in the military 
theorising of Tukhachevskii, Triandifillov and others about how to use 
the tanks and planes in a series of crushing blows aimed at the deep 
rear of the enemy. This idea of 'deep battle' and later 'deep 
operations' became part of Red Army doctrine and the writings of 
'. 
318 Writing Europe's Pasts 
Tukhachevskii and his fellow modernisers earned praise around the 
world. Ironically, mechanisation led to a second lease of life for the 
Red cavalry whose numbers increased substantially in the mid 1930s. 
In 1929, there were twelve cavalry divisions with a total strength of 
77,000 sabres.
21 
In 1935 the number of cavalry divisions increased to 
thirty-two, albeit in a period when the Red Army more than doubled 
in size. It was neither Budennyi's histrionics nor favouritism on the 
part of Voroshilov that lay behind this cavalry revival but 
Tukhachevskii's concept of deep battle. Initially, deep battle assumed 
close cooperation between tank formations, infantry and cavalry. The 
first stage, the forming of the breech, did not involve cavalry but the 
second stage of developing the tactical success would require the 
mobility not only of large tank units but 'mechanised' cavalry, 
meaning cavalry units supported by tanks and infantry.22 
Tukhachevskii not only welcomed the creation of two c'l,valry corps in 
1932, but he was almost apologetic for his earlier disparaging of the 
Red cavalry. As Tukhachevskii put it, 'a few years back we were 
talking about the end of cavalry but now the role of cavalry has grown 
significantly - specifically with the advance of mechanisation'. 23 
Budennyi was especially happy with this new state of affairs. 
With an evident sense of self-justification he noted that: 
For many years everybody cursed the cavalry. But that was because they did 
not understand it. Now great changes are happening in our country. We are 
changing too and so too are our tactics and operative art. If in the past we 
thought the way forward was to smash the forward defences of the opponent 
now we demand that the opponents whole system of defence be attacked in 
all of its depth not only from a tactical point of view but from an operational 
point ofview.24 
Voroshilov, by contrast, took little comfort in this temporary detente 
among his subordinates. Voroshilov was neither satisfied with the 
theory of deep battle, nor with the performance of the Red cavalry. He 
did not think that deep battle was particularly new given that punching 
a hole in the enemy's defences and exploiting the breach with cavalry 
was the thinking at the outset of W orld War One. Voroshilov 
complained that Tukhachevskii failed to take into account that the 
enemy would be moving and that therefore there would not be a static 
defence to be penetrated. Voroshilov did not see how the tanks could 
be properly supported and he worried about the tank's vulnerability to 
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anti-tank aircraft. Voroshilov may have missed the subtler points of 
deep battle but he was not arguing for the tank to be replaced by the 
horse. Voroshilov fully supported the Red Army's mechanisation even 
if he argued constantly with Tukhachevskii about how this was to be 
achieved. Thus, in 1930 Voroshilov, backed by Stalin, engaged in a 
major dispute with Tukhachevskii over the latter's plans for 
mechanising the army. The point of contention was not any 
conservatism on the part of Stalin and Voroshilov but whether the 
necessary resources could be found to tum Tukhachevskii' s plans into 
reality.25 
Even as cavalry numbers were increased in 1935, Voroshilov 
declared himself unimpressed by arguments from the cavalry that the 
dismounted cavalryman was as good as an infantryman. Cavalry was a 
poor substitute for infantry because only two out of three cavalrymen 
were able to fire their rifle while the third tended to the horses. Dive-
bombers and chemical weapons were, in Voroshilov's opinion, 
insurmountable obstacles for the cavalry. In 1935, Voroshilov 
addressed Budennyi directly: 
I don't know whether Semen Mikhailovich (Budennyi) will agree with me. 
As an old cavalryman he is fond of cavalry in its pure form, so to speak. He 
finds it hard to accept the loss of cavalry of a type that has existed for 
centuries.26 
V oroshilov did not mince his words, remarking that: 
I must say that my impression is that in present conditions, given the 
contemporary tekhnika of the enemy, given the fact that the enemy is able to 
use fire from the ground and from the air and has the capacity to use chemical 
weapons, cavalry will fmd it very difficult to fight at all. 27 
At the end of 1935, the Soviet military establishment seemed to be at 
the peak of its power and prestige?S The military budget was huge, 
the Red Army boasted many more tanks and aircraft, the post of 
marshal was reintroduced with V oroshilov, Tukhachevskii, Budennyi, 
Alexander Egorov and Vasilii Bliukher being the first five to be so 
honoured. Many cavalry units were now renamed as Cossack units as 
so many of them were known in the Russian Army. On the other hand, 
1936 saw not just the first of the civilian 'show trials' but an 
increasing number of arrests of Soviet military personnel. One of the 
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few acknowledgments handed out by historians to Voroshilov is that 
he successfully quarantined the military from the less murderous 
purges of 1929-30 and 1933-34.29 Far from welcoming the new 
purge, Voroshi1ov tried an argument that had worked in the past, that 
the armed forces attracted more politically conscious personnel than 
other areas of the Soviet state. At the February-March plenum in 
1937, Voroshilov contended that not many wreckers had been 
discovered, the reason being that the military attracted the best and 
most loyal citizens of the Soviet state. Molotov contradicted 
Voroshilov and refused to accept that the military was immune to 
infiltration by scheming wreckers and Gestapo agents.3D Soon after, 
V oroshilov fell into line and did all that was asked of him in carrying 
out the purge. At his trial, TUkhachevskii was accused of working for 
the Nazis, plotting against Voroshilov and being biased against the Red 
cavalry. The last charge was made by Budennyi. While it is now 
apparent that the purge took a smaller percentage of the high 
command than previously thought - earlier acounts estimated that as 
many as half the total number of officers were purged31 _ the havoc 
wreaked at the very top of the Red Anny and the gradual progress 
downwards of the arrests and executions into the lower ranks undid 
years of effort and planning. Voroshilov made no effort to save any of 
his fellow officers or their families. Whether he had come to believe 
the charges against his fonner colleagues or whether he acted as he did 
for reasons of self-preservation or vengeance is impossible to know. 
What is clear is that the purge did not coincide with any change 
in attitude on the part of Voroshilov towards the Red cavalry. 
Voroshilov's address to the surviving members of the Military Council 
at the end of 1937, now dominated by veterans of the Red cavalry, did 
little to ease the apprehension of the cavalry leaders. Voroshilov 
acknowledged that there were theatres of war such as the East and 
Near East where cavalry still might play a role but emphasised that 
'we have to reduce the cavalry in size and increase the size of other 
anns'. The Defence Commissar was of the opinion that in future it 
was likely that 'cavalry will playa truly modest role on our western 
theatre, archmodest, perhaps an auxiliary, third-rate role'. Voroshilov 
was just as adamant at this meeting that large tank fonnations would 
remain, that they were necessary 'for contemporary battle, for 
contemporary war'.32 Budennyi objected strongly to Voroshilov's 
assertion that the Red Anny had 'plenty of cavalry', retorting that 
there was 'very little cavalry, in fact' and claimed that 'as soon as the 
Brown 
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war begins all will shout give us cavalry'. VoroshiIov's response was 
unyielding: 
You are talking with your cavalryman's heart and I well understand it. As a 
man and a cavalryman I sympathise... But reality is moving away from us 
and we would be cava1rymen of the medieval type - Don Quixote was a 
cavalryman too - if we do not take account ofreality.33 
Cavalry numbers were not as meagre as Budennyi made out but had 
indeed stagnated after the expansion of 1935. During the purge years 
of 1936 to 1939 the number of cavalry divisions remained the same 
while the number of infantry divisions increased from ninety to one 
hundred and fifty.34 As a Soviet history of the Red cavalry put it, 
many cavalrymen survived the purge only to be retrained as tank 
drivers.
35 
If the purge really were a cavalryman's coup aimed at 
preserving the mounted ann, it clearly failed in its mission. 
Voroshilov was removed as Commissar for Defence in 1940 
after the disastrous winter war with Finland. His place was taken by 
another veteran of the First Cavalry Anny, Semen Timoshenko. A 
damning report was prepared on Voroshilov's failure to resolve the 
Red Anny problems although one of the few accusations not to be 
made against him was that he had relied too much on cavalry. When 
the Nazi thunderbolt fell on 22 June 1941 Stalin responded by 
dividing his front line into three commands, with Voroshilov taking 
the northwestern part of the line, Timoshenko put in charge of the 
centre and Budennyi the south. It was a measure of how much Stalin 
valued political loyalty in the anny. As the entire front crumbled 
under the Gennan onslaught all three fonner cavalrymen were 
replaced, none showing any particular ability for field command in 
modern conditions albeit in a situation that would have tested the most 
gifted commander. In the Civil War, Voroshilov taught himself to 
shoot and ride with the best of the men he led but his strengths lay in 
organisation and personal bravery, not in tactics or strategy. 
Voroshilov's value to the Red Anny in the 1920s and 30s was always 
going to be as an administrator and advocate of the anned forces to its 
political masters not as a military theorist or fighter in the field. 
The idea that Voroshilov was obsessed with the Red cavalry was 
an invention of de-Stalinisation, a convenient way to contain as much 
as possible the blame for the military purge and the Red Anny's poor 
showing in 1941. Voroshilov was an excellent military villain, a vain 
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and uneducated Communist upstart who was so stupid as to believe 
that the Red Army could sabre its way to victory in the coming war. 
The scapegoating of V oroshilov was able to build on images of 
discredited World War One generals hopelessly out of touch with the 
new weaponry and refighting the battles of the Napoleonic era. 
Voroshilov was an excellent foil to the able Tukhachevskii, the latter 
held up as the model of a good Communist and a truly professional 
soldier. That these stories were unhelpful caricatures is all too obvious 
now. Voroshilov was not opposed to tanks, nor did he favour the 
cavalry. Tukhachevskii's plans were often unrealistic and he helped to 
prepare his own demise by taking part in the removal and humiliation 
of fellow veterans of the tsarist army.36 From the litany of woes that 
beset the Red Army on the eve of World War Two, we can at least 
subtract one of its alleged weaknesses. While Voroshilov must take his 
share of the blame for the failings of the Soviet military establishment, 
the Red Army did not suffer for fifteen years under the leadership of a 
man inflexibly committed to the cavalry arm. 
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